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RESOURCES:
Farmers' Rights and Genetic Conservation in Traditional
Farming Systems
Brush, Stephen (1992): Farmers' Rights and
Genetic Conservation in Traditional Farming Systems World
Development, Vol. 20, No. 11, pp. 1617-1630 |
Summary
This article argues that
intellectual property rights such as plant breeders' rights or patents should
not be used to protect crop genetic resources. Rather, farmers' rights should
be used as an alternate form of intellectual property rights, to compensate
farmers indirectly by supporting genetic conservation. These conclusions are
based on an analysis of the role of genetic resources in traditional farming,
intellectual property rights over plant varieties and potentials of the concept
of farmers' rights.
Brush highlights four reasons why intellectual
property protection is not adaptable to the situation of traditional farming
and crop varieties (p. 1628): (a) the usual criteria for recognizing plant
breeders' rights (novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability) do not apply
to traditional knowledge systems as they are normally part of public knowledge,
(b) severe accounting problems would accrue, since crop improvement is based on
numerous genetic sources, and it would be unreasonable to assign proportional
values to the resources from each relevant country, (c) the primary beneficiary
would most likely be the nation state rather than farmer conservers, and (d)
the focus on equity and compensation does not explicitly address the pressing
problem of improving crop genetic conservation. Therefore, concludes Brush,
farmers' rights should be embraced without the cumbersome baggage of
intellectual property rights'. He warns, however, that extending farmers'
rights is not without pitfalls. One of these pitfalls would be that farmers
could be bypassed by the elite in their countries when compensation is to be
organized. Another would be that the transaction costs would be too high and
that the systems would prove inefficient. |
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